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Introduction(2)
There have been some historically large equity price
movements since the financial crisis began in mid-2007.  In
the two years to their March 2009 trough, UK equity prices
experienced one of their largest two-year falls since data
werefirst recorded in 1693 (Chart 1).  Since then, equity
prices have risen sharply, experiencing the eighth largest
eleven-month increase.  This recovery in equity prices was
accompanied by unprecedented policy actions, including
the Bank of England’s programme of asset purchases —
sometimes referred to as quantitative easing.(3)
Nonetheless, real equity prices remain below previous
peaks in 1999 and 2007 (Chart 2). 
Equity prices can directly affect the economy via a number
of channels.  For example, they can influence consumer
spending through their impact on both households’
financial wealth and consumer confidence.  They also
affect the cost of capital raised in equity markets and,
hence, companies’ investment decisions.  And large,
persistent moves in equity prices may affect the resilience
of market participants’ balance sheets, potentially increasing
the risks to financial stability.  Aside from their effects on
the economy, equity prices also provide policymakers with
an insight into market participants’ views about the outlook
for companies, as well as the wider macroeconomic
environment.  This can in turn help policymakers with the
significant challenge of identifying the types of shocks that
have hit the economy.
It is therefore important to understand the factors that have
driven changes in equity prices.  This article focuses on the
movements in equity prices since the start of the financial
crisis in Summer 2007.  As background, the next section
briefly outlines some different approaches to analysing equity
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Sources:  Global Financial Data Inc. and Bank calculations.
(a) Composite index comprising of East Indies stock for 1693;  Bank of England and East Indies
shares from 1694 to August 1711;  Bank of England, East Indies and South Sea shares from
September 1711 to January 1811;  Rostow’s Total Index of Share Prices from 1811 to 1867;
London and Cambridge Economic Service Index from 1867 to 1906;  The Banker’s Magazine
Index from 1907 to May 1933;  Actuaries General Index from June 1933 to April 1962;
FTSEAll-Share from April 1962 onwards.
(b) Non-overlapping two-year falls.
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prices.  The following section then discusses the simple
conceptual framework used in this article.  The final two
sections present the results of the analysis along with some
sensitivity analysis. 
Interpreting equity price movements
There is a vast academic literature on methods for evaluating
equity prices, as well as a variety of approaches used by
practitioners.  For example, behavioural finance theory
suggests that psychological influences can affect the
behaviour of investors and subsequently asset prices.  Such
influences include herding behaviour, where individual
investors join the crowd of others in a rush to buy or sell assets
(Brunnermeier (2001)), and so-called ‘cognitive dissonance’,
where investors ignore information that conflicts with their
prior expectations (Drees and Eckwert (2005)).
Many approaches, however, adopt a common foundation.
They are based on the idea that the price of any asset should
reflect the present value of its future stream of income,
discounted using a risk-free rate plus an additional
compensation that captures the risk of holding the asset — in
the case of equities, the so-called equity risk premium.  The
extra compensation follows from investors’ aversion towards
risk.  Investors require higher returns than the risk-free rate to
hold assets that provide uncertain pay-offs and that tend to be
positively correlated with the business cycle and with other
assets.(1)
Among the simplest and best known of these approaches are
the so-called ‘ratio variables’.  They generally express equity
prices as a proportion of current or expected future income.
These ratios are generally compared to their long-run averages
to assess the most recent data against a historical standard.
One of the most commonly used ratio variables is the
price-earnings ratio which compares current equity prices to
companies’ earnings (Chart 3).(2) But ratio variables are very
simplistic.  For example, the price-earnings ratio generally uses
past earnings rather than the expected future stream of
income, and it also ignores changes in both the risk-free rate
and the equity risk premium. 
Instead, this article uses the so-called dividend discount
model (DDM), which is a simple but flexible accounting
framework that addresses some of these shortcomings.  It is
based on the notion discussed earlier that equity prices
represent the risk-adjusted present value of the future cash
flows that shareholders expect to derive from equities.  An
increase in expected future cash flows, holding everything else
constant, should have a positive effect on equity prices.  By
contrast, a rise in the risk-free rate implies a higher rate at
which future cash flows are discounted, and should have a
negative effect on equity prices.  Similarly, a higher equity risk
premium should lead to a fall in equity prices.  But while these
components are treated separately in the model, in practice
they are likely to be affected by common factors and so to be
intrinsically linked (see Kiley (2000)).  
An application of the dividend discount model
The DDM requires a number of inputs — namely expected
future cash flows, the risk-free rate and the equity risk
premium.  These variables are however unobservable, so
various assumptions and proxy measures are used instead.  As
a result, any conclusion drawn from the output of the DDM
depends crucially on the plausibility of these assumptions and
proxies, which could change over time.  This section outlines
(1) The complexity of these approaches varies greatly from simple valuation measures to
the evaluation of equities in a general equilibrium framework (Cochrane (2005)).
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(a) Index as in footnote (a) of Chart 1 deflated using the consumer prices index (CPI) as
calculated by Global Financial Data Inc.  Monthly averages.
Chart 2 UK real equity prices(a)
1990 95 2000 05 10
UK ten-year
  price-earnings ratio
US ten-year
  price-earnings ratio
Ratio
Dashed lines represent the average 







Sources:  Global Financial Data Inc., Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) Monthly averages.  The equity markets are proxied by using the following indices:
FTSEAll-Share for the United Kingdom and S&P 500 for the United States.
(b) As earnings vary considerably through the business cycle, the ratio of real equity prices to a
ten-year trailing average of real earnings is used.  The deflator used is the CPI as calculated
byGlobal Financial Data Inc. for the United Kingdom and the Datastream CPI for the
United States.
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the baseline assumptions for the DDM used in this article.  This
model extends previous Bank work (Panigirtzoglou
and Scammell (2002)) and is discussed in more detail in the
annex.(1)
Expected future cash flows
Expected future cash flows are a function of the current level
of cash flows and their expected future growth.  As is common
practice, this article makes two simplifying assumptions.  First,
current cash flows are proxied by dividends.(2) Hence, an
increase in current dividends, holding everything else constant,
should boost equity prices since cash flows are expected to
grow from a higher level.  Second, the ratio of dividends to
earnings (the payout ratio) is kept constant going forward.  So
dividends are assumed to rise at the same rate as earnings.(3)
This means it is possible to use projections for the growth in
companies’ earnings to capture changes in the expected future
income stream derived from holding equities.
A further assumption often made is that the expected growth
rate of dividends is constant.  Although this assumption greatly
simplifies the present value calculations, it may lead to
misleading conclusions, particularly when economic prospects
are changing dramatically such as over the past two years.
Hence, this article extends previous Bank work and allows
dividends growth to vary in the near and medium term before
reverting back to a long-run growth rate. 
Investors’ earnings expectations are not directly observable,
but over the short and medium term there exist surveys of
analysts’ expectations.  Some of the most widely used
survey-based measures for earnings expectations are published
by the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES).  These are
consensus forecasts of quoted companies’ earnings per share
which can be used to generate earnings projections.
In contrast, it is hard to obtain publicly available estimates for
earnings expectations over the long term.  But long-term
earnings can be proxied in a number of ways.  One approach
relates the expected future long-term growth rate to current
and past observable variables.  But while this allows the
long-term growth rate to be calibrated within the DDM, it can
sometimes lead to unrealistic results (see annex).  An
alternative is to express the long-term growth rate as a
function of long-term forward interest rates such as overnight
index swap (OIS) rates.(4) OIS rates will contain expectations
of future interest rates, so they may be closely linked to the
expected long-term growth rate of the economy.  But
long-term sterling OIS rates were relatively illiquid before
mid-2008 and so may have provided a poor guide to expected
future interest rates.  
A simpler approach is to assume that the expected long-term
growth rate is constant and equal to an estimate of the
potential growth of the economy.  This article uses this latter
approach, while recognising that the choice is essentially
arbitrary.
The risk-free rate
The risk-free rate is usually proxied by government bond yields,
given that in general these are the safest long-term assets
available to investors.  In this article, the baseline case uses
rates inferred from zero-coupon government bond yield curves
at maturities up to ten years.(5) But other proxies for the
risk-free rate could be used.  One option is to use OIS rates
after mid-2008;  this will be discussed further in the
sensitivities section later in the article.
The equity risk premium
The equity risk premium is also unobservable, but it can be
extracted as a residual from the DDM using observed equity
prices and the inputs already discussed.  In other words, an
implied level of the equity risk premium can at each point in
time be backed out from the DDM using the observed level of
equity prices and the inputs used for investors’ expected future
earnings and the risk-free rate.  In this way, contributions to
moves in equity prices due to shifts in the implied risk
premium can be inferred. 
Accounting for recent large movements in
equity prices
The DDM provides a framework to assess the factors that
might account for the observed large movements in equity
prices since mid-2007, prior to the start of the financial crisis.
Based on the inputs discussed previously, Chart 4 shows an
indicative breakdown of the contributions to the changes in
international equity prices between mid-2007 and early
February 2010.  The decomposition suggests that UK and
euro-area equity prices have been supported by lower
government bond yields.  But, over the same period, realised
dividends and earnings expectations have generally fallen,
which other things equal would suggest a lower contribution
to equity prices.(6) For all three indices, prices fell by
considerably more than can be attributed to changes in the
perceived outlook for earnings or government bond yields,
suggesting that higher equity risk premia also probably played
a role. 
Although Chart 4 provides useful insights into the total fall in
equity prices since mid-2007, it does not address what could
account for the large fall in equity prices to their March 2009
trough and their subsequent partial rebound (Chart 5).  
(1) The model incorporates more detailed and new information on earnings prospects
and the term structure of government bond yields.
(2) Companies can distribute their earnings to shareholders by paying dividends or by
buying back shares (Wadhwani (1999)).
(3) Throughout this article the term ‘earnings’ refers to companies’ annual net profits.
(4) For further information, see Joyce and Meldrum (2008).
(5) The model approximates the long-term interest rate used in the last stage of the
DDM with the five-year, five-year forward rate.
(6) The positive contribution of earnings expectations for US equities may reflect a
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The rebound in equity prices was preceded and accompanied
by unprecedented policy actions to support monetary and
financial stability.  In the United Kingdom, for example, a
number of measures were put in place to support the banking
sector, including liquidity insurance, additional capital
investment and asset protection schemes.(1)
In addition, the Monetary Policy Committee cut Bank Rate to
historic lows and embarked upon a programme of asset
purchases aimed at supporting nominal spending in order to
keep inflation close to target.  Besides purchasing private
sector corporate debt securities, which were undertaken with
the aim of improving the functioning of the UK commercial
paper and corporate bond markets, the Bank of England’s Asset
Purchase Facility has purchased £198 billion of UK government
bonds.(2) These purchases, together with the cuts in Bank Rate,
are likely to have pushed down on government bond yields
(Chart 6) and, other things equal, might have reduced the rate
at which to discount future cash flows.(3) Indeed, government
bond yields fell to be around their lowest levels since the
mid-1950s.  Moreover, it is likely that the policy actions helped
to improve earnings expectations.
Market contacts have suggested that these policy actions by
central banks and governments are likely to have prevented
more severe downside risks from materialising.  And the asset
purchase scheme, along with those implemented by other
countries, is likely to have encouraged investors to rebalance
their portfolios away from government bonds towards riskier
assets such as equities.(4) Each of these would have reduced
the risk premium investors require to invest in equities, which
appears consistent with information from option prices.  For
example, the implied distribution of future equity prices
narrowed, implying that investors became less concerned
about large future falls in equity indices (Chart 7).
However, the impact of those recent unprecedented policy
actions cannot be precisely quantified.  Therefore, it is difficult
to draw firm conclusions about the relative contributions of
policy to the factors that have driven changes in equity prices.
Rather than focusing on the effect of these exceptional
measures, the rest of this section looks into decomposing UK
equity price movements in greater detail.  It examines first the
factors that drove the decline in equity prices up to
March 2009, before moving on to consider what contributed
to the subsequent recovery in equity prices.  In doing so it
focuses on three distinct periods:
(1) The UK Government has put in place an Asset Protection Scheme designed to protect
financial institutions against exposure to exceptional future credit losses on certain
portfolios of assets.  For more details see Table 1.B on page 17 of the June 2009
Financial Stability Report, available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2009/fsrfull0906.pdf.
(2) For more details, see www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/apf/index.htm.
(3) The price of bonds is inversely related to the yield.  So a rise in bond prices is
associated with lower yields.
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Sources:  Bank of England, Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) The equity markets are proxied by using the following indices:  FTSE All-Share for the
United Kingdom, S&P 500 for the United States and DJ Euro Stoxx for the euro area.  All are
in local currencies.
(b) The above decomposition reflects the contribution of changes to individual variables in the
model, scaled to match the total change in the equity index over the period.
Chart 4 Indicative contributions to changes in
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Sources:  Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
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• 5 July 2007 to 3 March 2009;
• 3 March 2009 to 6 May 2009;  and 
• 6 May 2009 to 3 February 2010.
The indicative decomposition suggests that the fall in equity
prices from the pre-crisis levels to the March 2009 trough can
be accounted for by falling earnings expectations and higher
equity risk premia, partially offset by lower government bond
yields (Chart 8).  The implied equity risk premium picked up
markedly during the worst of the financial crisis in 2007–08, as
investors became increasingly concerned about the risks
associated with holding equities.
The recovery in UK equity prices appears to have been a story
of two halves.  The period between March and May 2009,
when the UK index increased by around 25%, seems to have
been characterised by a falling risk premium, while earnings
expectations decreased further.  Since May 2009, earnings
expectations have recovered, providing substantial support
to equity prices, and the equity risk premium has fallen
further.(1)
Sensitivity analysis 
The results are sensitive to the different assumptions and
proxies imposed on the model so applying the DDM in such a
mechanical way could lead to misleading conclusions.
Consequently, this final section uses some alternative proxies
to assess the sensitivity of the results to the accuracy and
timeliness of the DDM inputs. 
Different proxies for earnings expectations
According to IBES figures, earnings expectations were revised
downwards in the initial phase of the recovery in equity prices
between March and May 2009 (Charts 8 and 9).  But these
earnings forecasts are imperfect proxies of expected cash
flows.  And evidence from academic studies and market
intelligence suggest that they may lag actual changes in
investors’ expectations.(2)




Sources:  Euronext.liffe and Bank calculations.
(a) For more details, see Clews, Panigirtzoglou and Proudman (2000).
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Sources:  Bank of England, Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) The above decomposition reflects the contribution of changes to individual variables in the
model, scaled to match the total change in the equity index over the period.



















Sources:  Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) Realised dividends for each year are extracted from the dividend yield ratio using the monthly
average for December.  Changes in dividends are generally announced following the release
of companies’ accounts.  Hence, extracted dividends are likely to reflect changes in
companies’ performance with a lag.  This may be a reason behind the wedge between the
latest realised dividends and earnings expectations for 2009.
Chart 9 Realised and projected dividends based on
IBES earnings per share growth forecasts for the
FTSEAll-Share(a)
(1) The results can be sensitive to the precise specifications of the model.  For example,
using the DDM based on Panigirtzoglou and Scammell (2002), the December 2009
Financial Stability Reportfinds that lower real interest rates could account for some of
the rise in UK equity prices since March 2009 (Bank of England (2009)).
(2) According to O'Brien (1988), the average reporting lag between analysts’ forecast
dates and IBES reporting dates is 34 trading days with a standard deviation of
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Dividend swaps — contracts that are directly linked to future
dividends (see the box on page 30) — may provide an
alternative proxy for investors’ expected cash flows.  After
falling sharply in 2008, dividend swap prices rebounded in
2009, broadly consistent with the recovery in equity markets
in March 2009 (Chart 10).(1)  This contrasts with IBES
forecasts, which continued to be revised downwards until
May 2009.
If dividend swap prices were to be used in the DDM instead,
downward revisions to earnings expectations might have
accounted for a larger proportion of the fall in equity prices up
to their March trough.  And the contributions of a falling equity
risk premium and higher earnings expectations could perhaps
correspondingly be more balanced between the two recovery
phases in 2009.
However, dividend swap prices may be affected by risk premia
due to the uncertainty around future dividends, and could also
contain liquidity premia, among other factors.  The lack of
longer-run dividend swap data complicates the task of
estimating the scale of these risk premia.  Hence, the rebound
in dividend swaps in March 2009 may have been driven by
either improved earnings expectations or a change in risk
premia, or a combination of the two. 
Alternative risk-free rate 
The decomposition shown in Chart 8 implies that lower
nominal government bond yields mitigated some of the fall in
equity prices from July 2007 to the trough. 
But government bond yields may not provide a good proxy for
the risk-free rate.  For example, they may reflect other factors
such as the supply of government bonds and investors’
preferences.  And the government bond market has been
affected recently by unprecedented policy measures, including
the Bank’s Asset Purchase Facility.  One option is to use OIS
rates instead.  But, as discussed earlier, long-term OIS rates are
only available since mid-2008 so can only be used over the
recovery phase.  Since the trough in equity prices in
March 2009, OIS rates have increased by more than
government bond yields (Chart 11).  This suggests that, were
OIS rates to be used instead of government bond yields, the
risk-free rate contribution would become more negative.  
Plausibility of equity risk premium
The implied equity risk premium is derived as a residual, and so
depends crucially on the other model inputs.  The model can
be used to compare changes in the level of the equity risk
premium over time.  The baseline model suggests that the rise
in the equity risk premium during the recent recession is
similar to that following the equity price fall in 2001–03
(Chart 12).(2) That may appear surprising, given the severity of
the financial crisis and the magnitude of the fall in UK and
world output since the start of the recession.  
One possible explanation is that expectations for UK-quoted
companies’ earnings were revised down more sharply during
the recent period than earlier in the decade, reflecting the
more severe domestic and global downturn (Chart 13).(3) This
larger revision in IBES earnings forecasts during the recent
period can therefore account for a greater proportion of the
fall in equity prices.  That in turn mechanically implies a
smaller rise in the equity risk premium than would otherwise
be the case.  In addition, policy actions by both central banks
and governments are likely to have reduced the likelihood of
more severe downside risks to the economy materialising.  And
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Index points Index points
Sources:  Barclays Capital, Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Calculated from a FTSE 100 three-year dividend yield index using the concurrent equity index
level for simplicity.  The swaps reference dividends paid in a calendar year between two and
three years ahead.
Chart 10 FTSE 100 dividend swap prices and equity index
(1) Dividend swaps are most commonly traded on the narrower FTSE 100 index, rather
than the FTSE All-Share.
(2) As shown in Chart 1 the two-year fall in UK equity prices in 2001–03 was similar to
that in 2007–09.
(3) Indeed, in March 2009 IBES implied cumulative four-year earnings growth was the
lowest since 1998, when data became available for the FTSE All-Share index.

















Sources:  Bank of England and Bank calculations.30 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q1
Alternative indicators of the equity risk premium can also help
to assess the plausibility of the profile implied by the DDM.
One such market indicator is option-implied volatility, which is
often used as a proxy for market participants’ uncertainty
about future equity prices.  However, measures of implied
volatility and the model-implied equity risk premium are not
directly comparable.  For example, option-implied volatility
captures the uncertainty over the maturity of the option (for
example twelve months), whereas the model-implied risk
premium captures the uncertainty over the whole life of
equities, which can be thought of as perpetuity.  Furthermore,
options are most commonly traded on the narrower FTSE 100
as opposed to the FTSE All-Share.
Chart 14 shows the level of twelve-month FTSE 100
option-implied volatility.  The sharp increase and subsequent
fall of this measure towards its average since 1998 is broadly
consistent with the changes in the implied level of the equity
Dividend swaps
A dividend swap is a financial contract that is directly linked to
the dividends paid by a specific equity or basket of equities.  It
has zero value at inception, and the final payment is
determined by the actual, or realised, level of dividends paid
over the time period specified by the contract (usually a
calendar year).
Typically, dividend swaps have been traded ‘over the counter’
as private contracts between counterparties.  However in
June 2008, Eurex introduced exchange-traded dividend futures
that reference the weighted aggregate level of dividends paid
by the companies included in the DJ Euro Stoxx 50 index.  And
in May 2009 Euronext.liffe introduced similar dividend futures
referencing the FTSE 100.
The mechanics of dividend swaps are similar to
fixed-for-floating interest rate swaps.  The buyer in a swap
agrees to make a fixed payment at expiry, which embodies
expectations of future dividends.  The seller in the swap agrees
to pay at that future date the realised dividends accrued over
the period (Figure 1).  Hence, the buyer of the swap makes a
profit if the realised dividend is greater than the agreed fixed
payment.
Generally, ordinary dividends accrued by companies in the
reference index over the life of the swap are included in the
pay-off.  Other cash flows to equity holders, such as share
buy-backs and large irregular dividend payments (so-called
‘special’ dividends) are typically excluded.  Some contracts
also exclude dividends paid as equity to existing equity
holders.
As the present value of expected cash flows on the dividend
swap changes over time, the price of the contract may
fluctuate.  Since the final payment is uncertain, the
appropriate discount rate for the future cash flows will include
an adjustment for risk.  This means that the market price of the
swap reflects not only investors’ expectations about future
dividends but also incorporates some compensation for the
perceived uncertainty around those expectations.  In addition,
other factors such as liquidity premia could affect dividend
swap prices.
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Sources:  Bank of England, Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) Monthly averages.  Diamond represents point at 3 February 2010.
Chart 12 DDM implied equity risk premium for the










Sources:  Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) Change in IBES forecasts over the same periods as those used in Chart 1.  Four-year growth
based on ‘year-on-year’ IBES earnings per share growth projections for the first three years
and the ‘over-the-cycle’ projection for the fourth year.
Chart 13 Changes in four-year cumulative growth in
earnings per share forecasts implied by IBES forecasts
for the FTSEAll-Share(a)Research and analysis Interpreting equity price movements 31
risk premium.  However, option-implied volatility increased to
a higher level than that reached in 2002.
Another way of gauging whether the implied level of the
equity risk premium is plausible is to compare it against a
measure of investors’ risk appetite, derived for example from
an econometric model.  Such a measure should be inversely
correlated with the equity risk premium — when risk premia
are lower (higher) risk appetite should be higher (lower).
Measures of risk appetite are typically volatile and should be
interpreted with caution.  But the profile of the DDM-implied
equity risk premium would seem to show a similar pattern to
one such measure of risk appetite (Chart 15). 
Conclusion
This article has discussed the factors that might help explain
the large equity price movements observed over the past
couple of years.  It has used an extended dividend discount
model to decompose the changes in equity prices into what
might be attributable to changes in earnings expectations,
government bond yields and shifts in equity risk premia. 
On balance, it appears that a combination of factors can help
explain the observed large equity price movements.  First,
changes in earnings expectations might account for a part of
the observed equity price movements.  Second, the excess
return required by market participants to compensate for the
risk of holding equities — the implied equity risk premium —
picked up sharply during the worst of the financial crisis before
falling back to around its average over the past eleven years.
Third, policy actions are also likely to have had an impact by
both lowering government bond yields and reducing the
likelihood of more severe downside economic risks
materialising, and thereby compressing the required equity risk
premium.  There remains substantial uncertainty about the
precise role and timing of each factor.  But all appear to have
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Sources:  Euronext.liffe and Bank calculations.
(a) Monthly averages.  Diamond represents point at 3 February 2010.
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Sources:  Credit Suisse, Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) Monthly averages.  Diamonds represent points at 3 February 2010.
(b) Adjusted so that positive (negative) numbers indicate higher (lower) risk appetite.
Chart 15 Investors’ risk appetite and the FTSE All-Share
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Annex
Description of the dividend discount model
The dividend discount model (DDM) is based on the notion
that equity prices should reflect the present value of the future
expected stream of income, discounted using a risk-free rate
(r) and an additional compensation that captures the risk of
holding equities — the equity risk premium (erp).  The future
stream of income should capture the cash flows accruing to
shareholders in the form of dividends and other pay-offs such
as share buy-backs.  But a common simplifying assumption
(also used in this article) is to proxy the cash flows with
dividends (D).  In this framework, the fundamental value of an 
infinitely lived equity (P) is given by:
The DDM used in this article, which extends previous Bank
work (Panigirtzoglou and Scammell (2002)), approximates the
above equation.  Dividends are assumed to move in line with
expectations of future earnings.  Dividend growth varies over
the first four years, before reverting back to a long-run growth
rate.  The term structure of the equity risk premium is assumed
to be flat.
This article extends the earlier model in two ways.  First, the
DDM in this article proxies the risk-free rate using government
bond yields up to ten years, rather than assuming a flat term
structure of interest rates.  This article also uses nominal rates
rather than real rates, thereby benefiting from greater data
availability at shorter maturities and avoiding the need to
transform IBES forecasts into real terms.
Second, the model incorporates more detailed information on
earnings prospects.  It includes ‘year-on-year’ IBES
‘earnings per share’ growth projections for the first three years
and the ‘over-the-cycle’ IBES projection for the fourth year.  By
contrast Panigirtzoglou and Scammell (2002) used
‘over-the-cycle’ projections for all four years. ‘Year-on-year’
projections are based not only on a larger number of forecasts
per company (on average 9 versus 1.5 over 2009) but they also
cover a larger proportion of companies in the FTSE All-Share
than the ‘over-the-cycle’ projections (70% versus 36% on
average over 2009).  Indeed market contacts consider the
‘year-on-year’ projections to be of higher quality than the
‘over-the-cycle’ forecasts.
This article adopts the simplifying assumption that the
expected long-term growth rate of earnings is constant.  It is
possible to generate a long-term growth rate within the DDM
by assuming that, over the long run, (i) companies’ return on
equity equals the cost of capital, and (ii) companies maintain a
stable dividend policy and earn a stable return on
investments.(1) But this ‘endogenous growth rate’ will change
in line with the equity risk premium, which can lead to
counterintuitive results.  For example, the endogenous growth
rate points to an unlikely sharp increase in long-term earnings
expectations for UK-quoted companies during the worst period
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Sources:  Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) Monthly averages.
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